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Irish America magazine - Aug/Sept '08 issue: The Global Irishman, In the Name of the Fada, Chicago and the Irish, Hannah’s Descendants, Roots: The Marvelous McDonaghs, Slainte: Dancing at Lughnasa, Review of Books, Ashley Davis - Finding Herself Through Her Past
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 Peacemaking
in Northern Ireland as a Model for Conflict Resolution Worldwide
When he was secretary for Northern Ireland, Peter Hain helped broker the
historic power-sharing agreement between Unionists and Republicans at
Stormont. The following is an abridged version of a lecture he gave at
Glucksman Ireland House-New York University on June 5, 2008.
Observing Northern Ireland today, it’s hard to recognize what was just a
decade or so ago the theatre for such horror and barbarity, hate and
bigotry. For fourteen months now, old enemies have worked together – and
even smiled at each other – when they had never exchanged a courtesy before.
Last year’s historic agreement has so far stuck, and I believe will stick
through ups and downs, precisely because it was brokered between the two
most politically polarized positions held by Ian Paisley’s Democratic
Unionist Party and Gerry Adams’ Sinn Féin.
But what are the lessons for international policy in other areas still
locked in similarly bitter conflict, violence and terrorism?
First, a need to create space and time, free from violence, in which
political capacity can develop; second, identifying key individuals and
constructive forces; third, the importance of inclusive dialogue at every
level, wherever there is a negotiable objective; fourth, the taking of risks
to sustain political progress including by talking with enemies; fifth, the
need to align national and international forces; sixth, avoiding or
resolving preconditions to dialogue; seventh, gripping and micro-managing
conflict resolution at a high political level, refusing to accept the
inevitability of it – and doing so, not intermittently but continuously,
whatever breakdowns, crises and hostilities get in the way.
In the Middle East, the conflict has not been gripped at a sufficiently high
level, over a sufficiently sustained period. Efforts and initiatives have
come and gone, and violence has returned to fill the vacuum. International
forces have not been aligned. Preconditions have been, and now are, a
crippling bulwark against dialogue. However, despite the depth and intensity
of bitterness and hatred between Hamas and Israel, neither can militarily
defeat the other; they will each have to be a party to a negotiated solution
which satisfies Palestinian aspirations for a viable state and Israel’s need
for security.
Addressing Palestinian grievances – from security to jobs and housing – as
we did in Northern Ireland, can create more fertile ground for a political
process to complement engagement.
However, Al Qaeda terrorism is fundamentally different. It is not rooted in
political objectives capable of negotiation, but rather in a reactionary
totalitarian ideology that is completely opposed to democracy, freedom and
human rights. Negotiation with Al Qaeda and its foreign Jihadists is
therefore politically and morally out of the question.
Yet offering individuals attracted to AQ a non-violent, political avenue to
address their concerns and frustrations could conceivably help produce
change in years to come. Northern Ireland’s Chief Constable, Hugh Orde, only
last week told The Guardian that discussions with Al Qaeda “wouldn’t be
unthinkable, the question will be one of timing.”
With the IRA’s bloody armed campaign raging over 30 years ago, nobody in the
British Government could stomach talking with Republican leaders except in
surrender terms since they were regarded as completely beyond the pale after
terrorist attacks on Britain, let alone within Northern Ireland; yet in the
middle of all this bloodshed and mayhem, contact was initiated which much
later on came to fruition.
Similar issues arise in Afghanistan, although the complexities of war lords
attached to the Taliban more for tactical reasons on the one hand, and the
presence of Al Qaeda leaders on the other, make the whole process especially
hazardous and complex.
In Sri Lanka, attempts a few years ago to broker a solution saw progress,
then impasse and violence again. But the only answer is to negotiate a
viable form of devolution to reconcile bitterly competing Singhalese and
Tamil interests. Just as both the British and the IRA came to understand,
there cannot be a military solution there for either side.
Similarly in the Basque region of Spain, either side may have temporary
armed advances, but the solution has in the end to be political, and the
mechanism negotiation.
In Kashmir, supporting efforts to take forward negotiations between Delhi
and Islamabad is the imperative. Here also, a seemingly irreconcilable
constitutional conflict could be addressed with ingenuity. The extent of
cross border structures (and the planned devolution of policing and justice)
was crucial to Republicans agreeing to share power in what remains still a
devolved part of the British state they disown. If India, Pakistan and the
Kashmiris themselves can agree to an entity with soft borders and greater
autonomy for Kashmiris on both sides of the line of control, then maybe
progress could be made whilst preserving the interests and longer-term
objectives of each.
The West urgently needs to match our commitment to global security with a
commitment to global justice and global conflict resolution. The Northern
Ireland experience, horrendous as it was, points to a re-balancing of
foreign policy to overcome horror with hope.
Peter Hain is MP for Neath and former Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland. His full lecture is available on www.irelandhouse.fas.nyu.edu
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